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This paper estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection 
policies  over  1988:Q1-2010:Q4  for  five  industrialized  economies  -  the  United  States, 
European  Union,  Australia,  Canada  and  South  Korea.    We  find  evidence  of  a  strong 
countercyclical trade policy response in the pre-Great Recession period of 1988:Q1 – 
2008:Q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates, real appreciations in 
bilateral  exchange  rates,  and  declines  in  the  GDP  growth  rates  of  bilateral  trading 
partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers.  We then apply 
this  pre-Great  Recession  empirical  model  to  realized  macroeconomic  data  from 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the Great 
Recession – e.g., for the US and EU, the model predicts new trade barriers would cover 
an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports, well above the baseline level of 2-3 
percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis. Finally, we examine why 
the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions.  While exchange rate 
movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the Great 
Recession, we provide  evidence  of one particularly important change in trade policy 
responsiveness; i.e., in this period, governments refrained from imposing new temporary 
trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative 
economic growth.  
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We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of 
financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new 
barriers  to  investment  or  to  trade  in  goods  and  services,  imposing  new  export  restrictions,  or 
implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. 
 
-  G20 Declaration, November 15, 2008  
 
1.  Introduction 
The imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs during the early days of the Great Depression has since 
established a widespread presumption that import tariffs and other forms of trade protection rise 
during periods of macroeconomic weakness.  During the Great Recession, the fear of new import 
restrictions led to pre-emptive statements like the G20 Declaration of November 2008. 
This paper uses quarterly data for the United States, European Union, Australia, Canada, and 
South Korea to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on import protection policies over 
1988-2010.  We  find  evidence  of  a  robust  countercyclical  trade  policy  response  in  the  pre-Great 
Recession period of 1988:Q1-2008:Q3. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the change 
in  the  domestic  unemployment  rate  is  associated  with  a  52  percent  increase  in  the  number  of 
imported products over which an economy initiates new temporary trade barrier investigations in the 
following quarter. Other macroeconomic factors also have important effects on trade policy; a one 
standard deviation appreciation in the bilateral real exchange rate leads to a 33 percent increase in 
import protection while a one standard deviation decrease in the growth rate of real GDP in a foreign 
trading  partner  results  in  a  60  percent  increase.    Finally,  when  we  extend  our  analysis  through 
2010:Q4 so as to analyze the Great Recession, one noteworthy change is to the relationship between 
import protection and a trading partner’s economic growth. During the Great Recession, governments 
refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against trading partners experiencing their 
own weak or negative economic growth.   
Our  evidence  paints  a  complex  picture  of  the  role  that  macroeconomic  shocks  play  in 
determining  trade  policy  for  countries  bound  by  the  WTO.  In  particular, our  results  indicate  the 
empirical relationships between macroeconomic shocks and trade policy are changing over time and 
across trading partners in ways that ultimately impact the worldwide distribution of import protection 
beyond that which takes place through tariff liberalization negotiations and trade agreements.  To 
document this phenomenon, our approach is to analyze determinants of temporary trade barriers   2 
(TTBs) – the relatively substitutable import restrictions under antidumping, countervailing duty, global 
safeguards, and the China-specific safeguard policies – because these are the predominant means 
through which industrialized countries have implemented new protection under the GATT and WTO 
since  the  1980s.
1  Quantitatively, these restrictions  have been  economically important;  e.g.,  the 
European Union and United States subjected 4-6 percent of their imported products at the 6-digit 
Harmonized System level to these policies at various points during our sample period (Bown 2011 a; 
Prusa, 2011). We focus on five economies – the United States, European Union, Australia, Canada and 
South Korea –  for three reasons. First, they are economically important - together they constituted 
more than 40 percent of world imports and more than half of world GDP in 2010. Second, we can 
accurately track and consistently measure trade policy changes over time and at high frequency (i.e., 
quarterly) due to the similarity of their trade policy institutions and international commitments. Third, 
these economies have high quality macroeconomic data at the quarterly frequency over a relatively 
long time series which facilitates an examination of business cycles.  
Given the severity of macroeconomic shocks that took place during the Great Recession, an 
open research question is why was the trade policy response so mild relative to expectations? Our 
formal analysis tackles this question by proceeding in three steps. Our first step is to estimate a model 
of macroeconomic determinants of import protection for these five policy-imposing economies over 
the pre-crisis period of 1988:Q1 – 2008:Q3. Figure 1 shows for each economy the time series of real 
exchange  rate  fluctuations,  changes  to  domestic  unemployment  rates,  and  counts  of  imported 
products subject to new TTB policies in the quarterly data over 1988-2010. 
Our second step is to use the model estimates from 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 to generate out-of-
sample predictions for trade policy responses during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4, given the macroeconomic 
shocks that arose during the Great Recession. The model predicts a surge in import protection for the 
United States and European Union in particular in 2009:Q3. In terms of trade values, back of the 
envelope  calculations  put  the  forecasted  new  TTB  import  protection  during  2008:Q4-2010:Q4  as 
                                                            
1 A reasonable question is the extent to which our singular focus on TTB policies fully captures the new import 
protection activity during 2008-2010 by the five economies in our sample. According to data from the Global 
Trade Alert, TTBs are by far the predominant trade policy instruments through which these economies directly 
erected new import-restricting trade barriers in 2008-2010. Appendix Table I lists the only other examples from 
these economies that the Global Trade Alert characterizes as “red” – i.e., the measure has been implemented 
and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests - and is directed at imports. From this 
list, it appears that only a South Korean increase in tariffs on 16 different products in January 2009 would be 
characterized as a substantial protectionist import restriction that is not captured by our focus on TTBs.   3 
covering  up  to  an  additional  15  percent  and  14  percent  of  non-oil  imports  in  the  US  and  EU, 
respectively. This projected new coverage would have added roughly five to seven times as much 
import protection as the entire US and EU stock of imports cumulatively covered by TTBs immediately 
prior to the crisis (Bown, 2011a).  
Finally,  in  order  to  understand  why  the  predicted  surge  of  import  protection  did  not 
materialize,  our  third  step  is  to  re-estimate  the  empirical  model on  data  that  includes  2008:Q4-
2010:Q4.  This  enables  us  to  compare  how  the  responsiveness  of  import  protection  policies  to 
macroeconomic shocks changed during the crisis, relative to the earlier period. First, we find robust 
evidence that policy-imposing economies refrained from imposing new import restrictions against 
those trading partners with weak GDP growth. This contrasts strongly with TTB determination before 
2008, and it is an important force for dampening the overall incidence of import protection during the 
Great Recession given that so many trading partners were undergoing periods of macroeconomic 
contraction. Second, our estimates indicate that bilateral real appreciations are typically associated 
with more TTBs.  Thus, for the United States and European Union, sharp real currency depreciations, 
especially in late 2009 through early 2010, likely contributed to a dampening of the trade policy 
response throughout 2010.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the determinants of import tariffs and 
other trade restrictions. Trefler (1993), Golberg and Maggi (1999), and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) pioneered empirical investigations into political-economic theories of endogenous trade policy 
formation (Hillman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). While the evidence indicated that lobbying 
for protection impacts trade policy; the quantitative effect of such political-economic determinants 
was  perhaps  smaller  than  had  been  expected.  More  recent  empirical  research  explores  classical 
economic theories regarding the role of the terms of trade in tariff determination (Bagwell and Staiger 
1990, 1999). For example, Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008) directly test the optimal tariff theory in 
a cross-section of hundreds of imported products for a set of countries that faced no internationally-
binding  external  constraints  in  setting  trade  policy.  Their  evidence  supports  the  theory  that 
governments set higher tariffs when export supply is more inelastic. In a different setting, Bagwell and 
Staiger (2011) find broad empirical support for terms-of-trade models of international agreements 
through a cross-sectional examination of negotiated tariff reductions for countries acceding to the 
WTO.  Finally,  Bown  and  Crowley  (forthcoming)  analyze  a  panel  of  time-varying  US  trade  policy   4 
decisions and find tariff increases are more likely in sectors with larger potential terms-of-trade gains, 
a theoretical prediction arising from dynamic models of self-enforcing trade agreements.  
The current paper further informs our understanding of import tariffs by providing a detailed 
investigation into the macroeconomic determinants of time-varying trade policy. While there is an 
empirical presumption that import protection rises during recessions, with the exception of papers 
like  Bagwell  and  Staiger  (2003)  and  Crowley  (2010)  there  is  surprisingly  little  economic  theory 
articulating  the  channels  through  which  the  countercyclical  relationship  between  new  import 
restrictions and macroeconomic shocks arise.
2 Thus, one purpose of this paper is to provide, in as 
much detail as possible, evidence on the explicit linkages between macroeconomic shocks and import 
protection.
3  
Our paper is  most closely related to the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of 
antidumping protection that includes Feinberg (1989), Knetter and Prusa (2003), and Crowley (2011).
4 
Relative to that work,  our approach makes a nu mber of advances, extensions and refinements  by 
                                                            
2  In  their  theoretical  paper, Bagwell  and  Staiger  (2003,  pp.  1-2)  best  articulate  the  failure  of  “political”  or 
“distributional” theories for trade policy to explain the countercyclical relationship between business cycles and 
import protection policies with  
 
“…a common argument is that tariffs are higher in recessions, because the political pressure from 
import-competing firms is then most pronounced. This explanation, however, is incomplete, since it 
ignores  the  political  influence  of  other  production  sectors  that  might  press  for  less  protection  in 
recessions…In light of these competing political influences, the common argument for countercyclical 
tariffs fails to be convincing, as it does not explain why the political pressures from import-competing 
sectors dominate in recessions but not in booms.” 
 
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) also contains extensive reference to a number of empirical papers from earlier 
periods documenting the countercyclical relationship between business cycles and import protection. 
 
3 During the revision process, we became aware of papers by Rose (2012) and Davis and Pelc (2012) that are 
interested in related issues. Rose (2012) challenges the idea that impo rt-protection is countercyclical.  Rose’s 
analysis examines a number of trade policy indicators at the annual frequency – including WTO disputes and 
applied  MFN  tariff  rates  –for  a  large  set  of  economies.  Davis  and  Pelc  (2012)  similarly  use  data  across  a 
heterogeneous sample of industrialized and developing economies at the annual frequency for the 1997-2009 
period to examine related questions.  
 
4  Feinberg  (1989)  focused  on  the  1982-1987  period  for  the  United  States  and  found  evidence  that  more 
antidumping cases were associated with dollar depreciations. Knetter and Prusa (2003) examine annual data for 
the  US,  Canada,  Australia  and  the  EU  over  1980-1998  and  find  strong  evidence  of  a  relationship  between 
antidumping cases and local currency appreciations over this longer time series of data. Crowley (2011) uses a 
cross-country, cross-industry panel from 1980-2001 and finds that the US imposed antidumping against foreign 
trading partners with weakness in manufacturing sectors.  
   5 
taking advantage of newly available and detailed data at the product-level from the World Bank’s 
Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2011b). First, we examine not just antidumping policy, but 
we also consider use of other, relatively substitutable forms of import protection that have taken on 
particular  importance  in  the  first  decade  of  the  2000s,  such  as  global  safeguards,  China-specific 
safeguards, and countervailing duties. Second, we focus our analysis on precise, bilateral measures of 
import protection – i.e., between a policy-imposing economy and a particular trading partner. This 
bilateral  emphasis  is  important  given  the  discriminatory  (i.e.,  trading  partner-specific)  nature  of 
import protection.
5  Third, we construct our trade barrier measures at the quarterly frequency and 
use  quarterly  macroeconomic data.    This  allows us to better address the relationship between 
business cycles, exchange rates, and import  restrictions and capture the precise timing of any trade 
policy changes taking place during the Great Recession.
6  
The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  predictions of  the 
theoretical literature on  temporary  trade  barrier  policies  such as antidumping, safeguards, and 
countervailing duties, the empirical model, and the panel dataset that is used to estimate the model. 
Section 3 presents our basic results regarding the relationship between trade restrictions and 
macroeconomic fluctuations based on historical data leading  up to the Great Recession. Section 4 
analyzes the import protection response after the onset of the worldwide financial crisis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
                                                            
5 Antidumping is explicitly a bilateral policy. Although it was often imposed simultaneously on multiple foreign 
trading partners in the 1980s and 1990s (see Hansen and Prusa, 1996), there is less evidence of this more 
recently (e.g., Bown, 2010).  
 
6 Other papers on trade policy during the Great Recession include Kee, Neagu and Nicita’s (forthcoming) study 
of  Overall  Trade  Restrictiveness  Indices,  Gawande,  Hoekman  and  Cui’s  (2011)  examination  of  applied  MFN 
tariffs  for emerging  economies, Bown’s (2011a) work on  TTB  measurement and  trade policy churning, and 
economy-specific  case  studies  by  Prusa  (2011),  Vandenbussche  and  Viegelahn  (2011),  Ludema  and  Mayda 
(2011) and Kang and Park (2011).  
   6 
2. Theory, Empirical Model and Data 
2.1. Theoretical models of temporary trade barriers and macroeconomic shocks 
 
A  large  theoretical  literature  examines  the  role  of  temporary  trade  barriers  in  international 
agreements such as the GATT and WTO.  Nevertheless, despite substantial research documenting the 
countercyclical nature of business cycles and import protection dating back to at least the Great 
Depression  (Irwin,  2011a,b),  there  is  not  one  universal  theory  linking  imposition  of  new  import 
restrictions to macroeconomic shocks. Bagwell and Staiger (2003), Crowley (2010) and Knetter and 
Prusa (2003) are the theoretical contributions that inform our basic empirical approach. 
Bagwell  and  Staiger  (2003)  model  dynamic,  self-enforcing  trade  agreements  that  are 
characterized by trade policy that fluctuates in response to macroeconomic conditions.
7  They relate 
business cycles to tariff increases in a  model with serially correlated shocks to growth .  In this rich 
model, two large symmetric countries play a trade policy game in which each period’s one-shot game 
for  every  traded  product  is  characterized  by  a  terms-of-trade-driven  prisoner’s  dilemma.  An 
international business cycle is modeled as fluctuations in the rate of growth of new product entry, and 
the international economy moves between periods of high growth and low growth according to two 
Markov-switching processes. Because of the possibility of terms-of-trade gains, the static welfare gain 
of a tariff hike increases with trade volume, and this would otherwise result in tariff increases being 
pro-cyclical. However, in the presence of the kind of positive, serially correlated growth shocks that 
give rise to recessions, cooperation to maintain low tariffs is more difficult in periods in which the 
expected rate of future trade growth is low.  Thus, unilateral tariff increases are less costly in welfare 
terms during recessions with persistently underperforming growth because it is precisely then that 
the cost of a trade war is relatively low.  This basic intuition generates the key empirical prediction of 
the model:  import restrictions increase during recessions.  
We turn to two partial equilibrium models (Crowley, 2010 and Knetter and Prusa, 2003) for 
guidance regarding two macroeconomic variables that exhibit considerable bilateral variation  – real 
foreign  GDP  growth  and  real  bilateral  exchange  rates.    Crowley  (2010)  builds  from  the  seminal, 
reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) to show that import restrictions increase in 
                                                            
7 Bagwell and Staiger (2003) build from an earlier model (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990) of self-enforcing trade 
agreements that links changes in trade policy to iid trade volume shocks. Bown and Crowley (forthcoming) use a 
sample of annual US data from 1997-2006 to provide evidence from much more disaggregated, industry-level 
relationships in support of the Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory.   7 
response  to  macroeconomic  weakness  abroad.  This  theory  focuses  on  the  international  rules 
regarding antidumping, one of the policies of particular emphasis for our empirical analysis.  In a 
model of imperfect competition in which domestic and foreign firms have capacity constraints, the 
foreign firm increases its exports to the domestic market at a “dumped” price when the foreign 
country’s own demand for the product falls.  In this environment, it is welfare-improving for the 
importing country to impose import restrictions against the foreign country that is trying to export its 
way out of a recession. The cross-sectional empirical prediction of this model is that an importer will 
impose  trade  restrictions  against  those  trading  partners  that  are  experiencing  negative  demand 
shocks in their own markets.
8   
Finally, Knetter and Prusa (2003) develop a stylized model of pricing behavior in a market with 
imperfect competition.  Their focus is on understanding how international rules regarding dumping, 
i.e. pricing below average cost, are impacted by exchange rate fluctuations. In their model of a foreign 
firm that prices to market, an appreciation of the domestic currency leads to a decline in the foreign 
firm’s marginal cost in terms of the importing country’s domestic currency. At the same time, pricing 
to market under imperfect competition implies a relatively smaller decline in the domestic currency 
price of the foreign good.  Thus, the foreign firm will simultaneously increase its sales in the domestic 
market (increasing the likelihood of injury to the domestic import-competing industry) and be less 
likely to be guilty of dumping. Because an exchange rate movement has opposite effects on the two 
criteria  for  dumping,  the model  gives  ambiguous empirical  predictions  regarding  the  relationship 
between an exchange rate appreciation and new antidumping import restrictions.
9  
In summary, the  literature on macroeconomic fluctuations suggests that temporary trade 
barriers increase when domestic macroeconomic conditions are weak (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003) and 
foreign  macroeconomic  conditions  are  weak  (Bagwell  and  Staiger,  2003;  Crowley,  2010).  A n 
appreciation of the domestic currency relative to a trading partner’s currency implies more import 
restrictions if a national authority’s antidumping investigation places more weight on the criterion of 
injury to the domestic industry than it places on the criterion of dumping (Knetter and Prusa, 2003).  
 
 
                                                            
8 Crowley (2011) examines US antidumping data for industries over 1980-2001 and finds evidence in support of 
this theory at the relatively disaggregated level. 
 
9 While Knetter and Prusa (2003) acknowledge the ambiguous theoretical predictions of their model, they find 
strong  empirical  evidence  at  the  annual  frequency  for  1980-1998  linking  exchange  rate  appreciations  to 
aggregated counts of antidumping filings for a sample that includes data from the US, EU, Australia and Canada.   8 
2.2 Empirical model 
 
This section presents an empirical model of the determinants of the number of imported products 
from a particular trading partner that a policy-imposing economy subjects to new temporary trade 
barrier  investigations.  The  model  relates  the  number  of  products  under  an  antidumping,  global 
safeguard, China safeguard, or countervailing duty investigation in a given quarter to the first lag 
(quarter t-1) of the percent change in the bilateral real exchange rate, the change in the domestic 
unemployment rate, and foreign real GDP growth.   
The dependent variable is the number of products that economy j (United States, European 
Union, South Korea, Australia, Canada) imported from trading partner i in quarter t that is subjected 
to a new TTB investigation. Empirically, the dependent variable is a non-negative count which exhibits 
over-dispersion in that the variance of the number of investigations per time period exceeds the 
mean (see Table 1).   
We formally model temporary trade barrier formation as generated by a negative binomial 
distribution (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). In this model, the number of imported products 
under  TTB  investigations,  yijt,  follows  a  Poisson  process  after  conditioning  on  the  explanatory 
variables, xijt, and  unobserved heterogeneity, uijt>0.  Specifically,  
 
)) , ( ( ~ , | β x m u Poisson u x y ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt   , where   ) , 1 ( ~ α gamma uijt .  
 
Thus, the distribution of counts of products subject to temporary trade barriers, yijt , given xijt follows a 
negative binomial with conditional mean and variance 
 
) exp( = ) , ( = ) | ( β x β x m x y E ijt ijt ijt ijt  and 
2 )) exp( ( + ) exp( = ) | ( β x α β x x y Var ijt ijt ijt ijt . 
 
We estimate the model using maximum likelihood with pair-wise fixed effects for importing country-
foreign trading partner  combinations.  The model is identified  off both inter-temporal and cross-
sectional variation in domestic unemployment rates, bilateral real exchange rates, and foreign trading 
partner GDP growth rates.  
   9 
2.3  Data and variable construction 
 
There  are  a  number  of  innovations  in  our  data  and  modeling  approach  relative  to  the  previous 
literature (e.g., see Knetter and Prusa, 2003).   
  Our first innovation concerns how to measure time-varying import protection.  We construct 
quarterly series of bilateral trade policy actions at the universally-defined, 6-digit Harmonized System 
(HS-06) product level from 1988:Q1-2010:Q4.
10 Specifically, our dependent variable is the count of HS-
06 imported products on which the government of economy j conducts a new temporary trade barrier 
investigation against trading partner i in quarter t and against which there is not already an existing 
TTB in place.
11 Inclusion of all forms of temporary import restrictions is important  because more 
recent episodes of import protection  –  including  the  2001-3  global  safeguard  on  steel  products 
imposed by the US, EU, and a number of other countries, and the 2009 China-specific safeguard the 
US imposed on imports of tires – took place under these alternative temporary trade barrier policies 
and would not be captured by an analysis restricted to antidumping.
 12 In robustness checks, we also 
construct the count of products investigated under antidumping policy alone and we re-estimate the 
model using this dependent variable to illustrate the implications.  
A second innovation in our approach is to examine data at the quarterly frequency; this is  
potentially  important  because  macroeconomic  shocks  may  cross  calendar  years.  The  key 
                                                            
10  These  series  derive  from  data  in  the  World  Bank’s  Temporary  Trade  Barriers  Database  (Bown,  2011b). 
Because the Harmonized System has been in place and utilized across countries only since 1988, the time series 
dimension of our data begins in 1988:Q1.  
 
11 We focus on products subject to new investigations, given research from Staiger and Wolak (1994) which has 
shown  that  even  an  investigation  can  have  trade-destroying  effects.  Nevertheless,  in  unreported  results 
available from the authors, we confirm that the evidence below extends to a redefinition of the dependent 
variable to counts of products under investigations that only conclude with formal trade barriers being imposed. 
 
12 This measure is carefully constructed for each policy-imposing economy by trading partner and by quarter in a 
conservative way that does not allow for redundancy . At any point in time in the sample period under the 
Harmonized System, there are roughly 5000 HS -06 imported products that could be imported from any 
particular trading partner. In terms of policy, governments impose these import restrictions at the 8- or 10-digit 
product level; unfortunately the  HS-06 level is the most finely disaggregated level of data that is comparable 
across countries. First, so as to avoid double counting in cases in which new import protection at the 8-digit level 
falls into the same HS-06 category as a previously imposed barrier, we do not include such products. Second, for 
our baseline import protection measure  that expansively covers all four TTB policies, we also do not include 
products that were subject to a simultaneous or previously imposed  barrier  under a different policy. This 
phenomenon is particularly relevant for countervailing duties as most have been imposed simultaneously with 
antidumping duties on the same products   against the same trading partners . For a discussion, see Bown 
(2011a). 
   10 
macroeconomic determinants of import protection in our model are bilateral real exchange rates, 
domestic unemployment rates, and the foreign trading partner’s real GDP growth, with each of the 
variables reflecting year-over-year changes at the quarterly frequency.
13 We define the exchange rate 
variable as the percent change in the real bi lateral exchange rate between the foreign  and local 
currency, so that an increase indicates an  appreciation  of  the  local  (policy-imposing  economy’s) 
currency.
14  The domestic  unemployment variable  is defined  as  the level change in the domestic 
unemployment rate. Our focus on unemployment follows Irwin (2005); in robustness checks we use 
domestic real GDP growth in lieu of unemployment and f ind  that  temporary trade barriers are 
typically more responsive to domestic unemployment changes than to real GDP growth.        
The third innovation that we stress in our panel data approach is t o  focus on bilateral 
relationships  between  policy -imposing  economies  j  and  their  key  trading  partners  i.
15  This  is 
potentially important for two reasons. First,  industrialized  economies  frequently  impose import 
restrictions through temporary trade barriers bilaterally.
16 Furthermore, we wish to examine whether 
import protection is applied against trading partners that are experiencing negative economic shocks 
                                                            
13 We are forced to use year-over-year changes in these variables as opposed to quarter-to-quarter changes due 
to how quarterly real GDP for China, one of the key trading partners in the analysis, is defined and available in 
the underlying data. Thus each of the key macroeconomic determinants is defined as a year-over-year change; 
i.e., quarter 1 of year t over quarter 1 of year t-1, quarter 2 of year t over quarter 2 of year t-1, etc. 
 
14 To coincide with the introduction of the euro in 1999, the estimates for the EU are based on a panel of data 
beginning  only  in  1999:Q1.  Furthermore,  there  are  a  number  of  other  issues  associated  with  variable 
construction for the EU over this time period that merit discussion. The EU underwent a sizeable membership 
expansion during the period 1999-2010 – from 15 countries at the beginning of the period to 27 by the end of 
the sample. Once a country becomes a member of the EU it can no longer be targeted by EU antidumping, 
safeguard, or countervailing duty policies – as such, 12 countries that were significant EU trading partners (and 
hence potential antidumping targets) in 1999 cannot be included in the sample because they were part of the 
EU  by  2007.  Furthermore,  the  expanding  membership  means  the  definition  of  the  economies  comprising 
domestic employment and being subject to a common EU exchange rate are changing over time, which creates 
potential additional issues of measurement error. 
 
15 The Appendix  provides a list of the fifteen trading partners included  for each of the five policy -imposing 
economies’ bilateral relationships. These trading partners cumulatively account for the source of 75 percent 
(EU) to 94 percent (Canada) of each policy-imposing economy's non-oil imports during the sample periods. We 
condition on trading partners targeted by TTBs because non-targeted trading partners would be dropped from 
the estimation given the nature of the included country fixed effects. 
 
16  Even  in  the  case  of  the  application  of  global  safeguards  –  which  are  supposed  to  be  applied  on  a 
nondiscriminatory  basis  against  all  import  sources  of  a  product  –  economies  typically  apply  them  in  a 
discriminatory fashion to exclude PTA partners or some developing countries. For a discussion, see Bown and 
McCulloch (2003). The construction of the policy variables in our bilateral panel data set only counts global 
safeguards against trading partners that were included in the policy.    11 
at home. Thus a modeling approach that considered only the use of import protection aggregated 
over trading partners may not accurately capture the importance of bilateral shocks.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the quarterly data used in the empirical analysis. The 
Appendix provides more information on the underlying sources of the data. 
 
3  Baseline Estimates from the Pre-Crisis Period 
 
Table 2 presents our first set of results for the “pre-crisis” period 1988:Q1 - 2008:Q3. We utilize a 
panel data set comprised of five economies j – the United States, the European Union, South Korea, 
Australia and Canada – and fifteen of each economy’s top trading partners i.  The dependent variable 
is defined as the count of HS-06 imported products against which the government of economy j has 
newly initiated a temporary trade barrier investigation against trading partner i in quarter t. 
As is common practice for negative binomial regression models, the tables report estimates 
for incidence rate ratios (IRRs) for the explanatory variables. That is, we report the ratio of counts 
predicted by the model when the first lag of an explanatory variable of interest is one unit above its 
mean value (and all other variables are at their means) to the counts predicted when all variables are 
at their means. An estimated IRR with a value that is statistically greater than 1 is evidence of a 
positive effect of the determinant of interest; i.e., the explanatory variable is associated with an 
increase in the number of imported products from trading partner i in quarter t that economy j 
subjects to a new TTB investigation. Conversely, an estimated IRR that is statistically less than 1 is 
evidence that an increase in the explanatory variable is associated with a reduction in the count of 
imported  products  subject  to  new  import  protection.  The  table  also  reports  t-statistics  (in 
parentheses) for whether the estimated IRR is statistically different from 1.  
The three macroeconomic determinants of interest are the percent change in the bilateral 
real exchange rate, the change in the domestic unemployment rate, and the foreign trading partner’s 
real GDP growth. The baseline model also includes a time trend as well as importer and exporter 
combined  (pair-wise)  fixed  effects  to  control  for  time-invariant,  bilateral  relationship-specific 
heterogeneity in policy treatment. For example, China’s designation as a non-market economy under 
antidumping provisions could affect the way that the United States treats China’s exporters relative to 
another economy’s exporters or relative to how Australia treats China’s exporters.  
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3.1  Pre-crisis estimates for the full sample of policy-imposing economies 
 
The baseline results in column (1) of Table 2 indicate a countercyclical trade policy response over 
1988:Q1-2008:Q3. Increases in the domestic unemployment rate and declines in foreign GDP growth 
are associated with more trade barriers and the IRR estimates are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  
The IRR of 1.62 on the change in domestic unemployment rate in the second row of column 
(1) is greater than 1 and indicates that import protection increases when the domestic economy is 
weakening through rising unemployment. The IRR of 0.88 on foreign real GDP growth is evidence that 
additional import protection is used against trading partners that are going through their own periods 
of weak economic growth. Furthermore, an estimated IRR of 1.02 indicates that a real appreciation of 
the domestic currency is associated with increased import protection through TTBs. This evidence is 
consistent with related results from a 1980-1998 sample of data on antidumping policy use reported 
by Knetter and Prusa (2003).  Finally, the time trend estimate of 0.99 indicates that, on average, 
import protection through these policies has been declining over the sample period.  
Specification (2) provides our first sensitivity analysis by replacing the variable capturing the 
domestic macroeconomic shock – the change in the domestic unemployment rate – with a variable 
defined as the growth rate of domestic real GDP in t-1. Theory predicts an IRR that is less than 1; i.e., 
weak domestic growth is associated with a higher incidence of TTBs. The estimated IRR is 0.93 and 
statistically  significant.  The  IRR  estimates  for  the other  determinants  of  interest  are  qualitatively 
unaffected by this alternative indicator of the health of the domestic macroeconomy. 
Before proceeding with additional robustness checks, consider next the economic magnitude 
of the estimated IRRs; Figure 2 provides a graphical interpretation. We present the percent increase in 
the  count  of  imported  products  per  trading  partner  per  quarter  subject  to  new  TTBs  that  are 
associated with a one standard deviation change in each macroeconomic determinant. Specifically, 
we compute the median of the model’s predicted estimates of import protection evaluated using the 
sample data; and we then introduce (one at a time) a one standard deviation shock to each of the 
macroeconomic  determinants  of  interest,  holding  everything  else  constant,  and  regenerate  the 
model’s predictions of import protection.  
The grey bars of Figure 2 present estimates based on specification (1) of Table 2, whereas the 
black bars illustrate impacts based on specification (2). First note from Table 1 that a one standard 
deviation increase in the percent change of the bilateral real exchange rate is roughly a 15 percent   13 
appreciation. Figure 2 indicates this 15 percent appreciation is associated with a 33 (34) percent 
increase in imported products subject to TTB protection per trading partner per quarter according to 
specification  (1)  (alternatively,  specification  (2)).  Next,  the  figure  illustrates  a  sizeable  estimated 
impact of domestic macroeconomic shocks. A one standard deviation increase to the change in the 
domestic unemployment rate – i.e., 0.86 or nearly one full percentage point (see again Table 1) - is 
associated with,  per trading partner, a 52 percent increase in import protection. In specification (2), 
when we use a one standard deviation decline in domestic real GDP growth – i.e., 2.3 percentage 
points – there is a significant, albeit smaller, 18 percent increase in import protection.
17 Finally, Figure 
2 illustrates the importance of economic growth in foreign trading partner i. A one standard deviation 
reduction to a trading partner’s real GDP growth – i.e., 3.5 percentage points - is associated with a 60 
percent increase in import protection against that partner based on specification (1) and a 70 percent 
increase based on specification (2).  
The  remaining  columns  of  Table  2  examine  the  robustness  of  our  results  to  alternative 
specifications of the underlying model.  
Column (3) of Table 2 reports a specification with alternative fixed effects. Instead of importer 
j and exporter i pair-wise fixed effects, we introduce separate importer j and exporter i fixed effects. 
The qualitative pattern to the results is unchanged; the only distinction is a reduction to the estimated 
size differential (away from 1) of the IRRs on foreign real GDP growth and the statistical significance of 
the IRRs for foreign real GDP growth and the time trend being reduced to the ten percent level. 
In column (4), we modify the baseline model by substituting the second lag of each of the 
macroeconomic  variables  for  the  first  lag.  The  qualitative  pattern  to  the  results  is  unchanged; 
however, estimated magnitudes of the impact of the domestic unemployment rate change and the 
foreign trading partner’s real GDP growth are slightly smaller. We return to this issue of the timing of 
shocks in more detail in our economy-specific estimates discussed below. 
Next we redefine the dependent variable in column (5) so that it includes only antidumping 
(AD) import protection. The estimated IRR on the impact of an appreciating domestic currency is no 
longer statistically different from 1. Furthermore, while the qualitative nature of the IRRs is similar to 
column (1), there is again a slight reduction to the size differential (away from 1) of the estimated IRRs 
for the domestic unemployment rate change and the foreign trading partner’s real GDP growth. This 
result stands in contrast to research covering earlier periods of data whereby an exclusive focus on 
                                                            
17 This is consistent with earlier results for the United States alone based on annual data (e.g., Irwin, 2005).  
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TTBs  through  AD  policy  alone  may  have  been  sufficient  to  capture  the  relationship  between 
macroeconomic  shocks  and  import  protection  (e.g.,  Knetter  and  Prusa,  2003).  One  important 
implication  of  our  results  is  that  a  sole  focus  on  antidumping  underestimates  the  relationship 
between macroeconomic shocks and time-varying import protection for these economies.  
In specification (6), we introduce a new covariate to the baseline model – the interaction of 
the domestic unemployment rate change   jt-1 with real GDP growth of trading partner  it-1. We 
include this interaction term in addition to each variable entering independently. The interaction term 
examines the possibility that economy j may be less likely to impose new import protection against 
trading  partner  i  –  despite  j’s  own  domestic  economic  contraction  –  if  there  is  a  simultaneous 
negative  economic  shock  abroad.  If  this  were  the  case,  since  a  negative  shock  to  the  domestic 
economy  is  captured  as  an  increase  in  the  domestic  unemployment  rate,  we  would  expect  an 
estimated IRR that is less than 1 for the interaction term and a potentially insignificant IRR estimate 
for the domestic unemployment change variable. However, we find no evidence of these relationships 
for this time period and this sample of policy-imposing economies. 
Finally, in specifications (7) and (8), we address the issue that the five economies might face 
different choice sets of import restrictions. First, the extent to which WTO commitments restrict an 
economy’s  freedom to raise  its  applied most-favored-nation  (MFN) tariff  rates  might vary  across 
economies.
18 In specification (7), we  control for this by  introducing a new variable defined as the 
annual change in the  share of economy j’s HS-06 products subject to strict WTO discipline, i.e., the 
share of products for which its applied MFN tariff is equal to (or above) its WTO legal maximum tariff 
binding.
19 We expect the IRR on this variable to be larger than 1  so that as more imported products 
                                                            
18 We anticipate that this issue does not matter much across these particular industrialized economies as they 
each have applied MFN tariff rates relatively close to their WTO tariff bindings. By design, this institutional 
similarity  influenced  the  focus  of  this  paper  to  these  five  policy-imposing  economies.  Put  differently,  one 
contributing explanation as to why we deliberately chose not to include a number of emerging economies in the 
empirical analysis is because there is substantial variation across those countries, products, and time as to the 
extent to which WTO commitments discipline their trade policies. We speculate that a much more serious 
treatment  of  the  choice  set  of  available  trade  policy  instruments  is  required  to  analyze  the  impact  of 
macroeconomic shocks on the import protection for such policy-imposing countries; thus we leave it to future 
research. 
  
19 The variable is constructed from HS-06 data on WTO maximum tariff bindings and applied MFN tariffs deriving 
from WITS; the data are available from only 1995-2010. Note that we define this variable as equal to or above 
(as opposed to simply equal to) because the early WTO period involved many of these economies phasing in 
reductions to their applied tariffs to levels that were only eventually at or below their bindings. We have also 
considered other modifications to the definition of this variable – e.g., defining it more flexibly as a product’s 
applied tariff being within a 1, 5 or 10 percentage point cutoff of the binding – and we obtain similar results. 
One key drawback to this variable worth noting is that data availability is limited to the annual frequency. This   15 
fall  under  WTO  discipline,  the  restricted  policy  choice  set  induces  more    substitution  of  import 
protection toward TTB policies. The estimated IRR of 1.04 on this variable in specification (7) is larger 
than 1 as expected, though it is not statistically significant. Second, we also introduce a TTB “stock” 
variable defined as the count of HS-06 products over which the policy-imposing economy j already 
had a TTB in effect against trading partner i in t-1. We expect an IRR that is less than 1 for this 
variable; i.e., the more imported products already subject to a TTB, the less scope for the economy to 
impose new TTBs. The estimated IRR is 0.99 and statistically significant.
20  
The downside to including these two variables is that it restricts our sample to the post-1995 
period, further limiting the business cycle variation in the data .
21 Therefore, to understand how our 
results are affected by omitting these controls for the available policy choice set, specification (8) re-
estimates the baseline model on the smaller sample of data used in specification (7). A comparison of 
specification (7) to (8) reveals very little change to the IRRs for the key macroeconomic determinants. 
We conclude that omitting controls for  the trade policy choice set does not appear to affect the 
results for these policy-imposing economies over this time period.   
To summarize  Table 2,  we present  evidence from  1988:Q1-2008:Q3 that macroeconomic 
shocks impact  import protection through temporary trade barriers. First, there is strong evidence of a 
countercyclical relationship between negative shocks to domestic employment (and to a lesser 
extent, domestic real GDP growth) and new import protection. Second, our comprehensive temporary 
trade barrier (TTB) measure exhibits greater measured co-movement  with macroeconomic variables 
than the antidumping measure used in the prior literature.  E stimates on antidumping alone fail to 
capture the true impact of these shocks on import protection, especially with respect to movements 
in bilateral real exchange rates .   The third point worth highlighting is that the  estimated IRR for 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
lack  of  inter-temporal  variation,  relative  to  all  of  the  other  variables  included  in  the  estimation  which  are 
defined at the quarterly frequency, in addition to the lack of trading-partner variation, is likely a contributing 
explanation to the statistically insignificant IRR estimate described in the text.  
 
20 In unreported results available from the authors, we have also estimated versions of the model in which we 
introduce each of these two variables separately, and the broad pattern of results does not change. 
 
21 First, the required data on WTO tariff bindings is only relevant and available for the post-1995 period. Second, 
the TTB stock variable is only constructed for TTBs imposed since the HS system has been in effect beginning in 
1988. The implication is that earlier in our sample, the stock measure based on available HS data would severely 
underestimate the actual TTBs in effect as it is not able to consider all of the TTBs imposed prior to 1988 that 
were still effect in the early 1990s. This is important for the historical users of TTBs such as Australia, Canada, 
European Union, and the United States. Thus the TTB stock measure constructed from HS-06 data becomes 
more accurate over our sample period as (unaccounted for) TTBs that governments imposed prior to 1988 are 
increasingly removed. 
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foreign real GDP growth is less than 1 in all specifications of Table 2. This is evidence that, on average, 
these economies tended to impose new import protection on trading partners that were themselves 
undergoing a period of weak economic growth or an economic contraction. This result is particularly 
important for understanding the differential government policy responses during the Great Recession, 
as we discuss in section 4.  
 
3.2 Pre-crisis estimates for subsamples of the US, EU and smaller economies 
 
Table 3 presents estimation results from the 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 period restricted to subsamples of 
data based on policy-imposing economies. We consider three subsamples in particular: estimates for 
the United States, European Union, and a combined sample of data jointly covering Australia, Canada, 
and South Korea. For each subsample of data, we present results from three different specifications. 
Columns  (1),  (4)  and  (7)  of  Table  3  present  the  same  baseline  model  specification  as  Table  2, 
specification  (1).  We  then  consider  robustness  checks  in  columns  (2),  (5)  and  (8)  in  which  we 
substitute the explanatory variables at the second lag (t-2) for the first lag. Finally, in columns (3), (6) 
and (9), we consider the impact of these determinants on the antidumping policy alone, as opposed 
to the more comprehensive dependent variable that covers all TTBs. 
  The results for the United States in Table 3 are consistent with the overall results reported in 
Table 2. Import protection through TTBs is associated with a real appreciation of the US dollar, an 
increase  in  the  US  unemployment  rate,  and  a  decline  in  trading  partner  real  GDP  growth. 
Furthermore, while importer j and exporter i combined fixed effects were also included as part of the 
model estimates in Table 2, we did not report them to conserve space. We report one fixed effect 
estimate in Table 3 in order to highlight the policy-imposing economy’s relationship with China. In 
specification  (1),  the  IRR  of  22.66  is  evidence  that  China  was  substantially  more  likely  than  the 
omitted trading partner (in this case, Australia) to face  US import protection.
22 As has been well 
documented  (e.g.,  Bown,  2010),  this  China  phenomenon  is  pervasive  across  policy -imposing 
economies. Next, in specification (2), when we  substitute the macroeconomic determinants at the 
second lag (quarter t-2) for the first lag, there is a reduction to the estimated size differential (away 
from 1) of the IRRs on the US unemployment rate change and the foreign trading partner’s real GDP 
                                                            
22 The IRRs for the other trading partners are not reported in the table but are available from the authors upon 
request. In terms of scale, the estimated IRR for China in the US models, for example, is typically twice as large 
as that for the second-highest trading partner. 
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growth compared to the baseline. Finally, specification (3) confirms for the US a finding in the full 
sample  of  data  (Table  2  column  5).  Limiting  the  dependent  variable  to  antidumping  yields  an 
insignificant estimate of the relationship between real bilateral US dollar fluctuations and new import 
protection.  
  Consider next the Table 3 results for the European Union, which we have noted are estimated 
on a shorter time series of data (1999:Q1-2008:Q3) to coincide with the introduction of the euro in 
1999. Estimates of the baseline EU model in column (4) are also in line with the theory. When we 
substitute the second lag for the first lag of the macroeconomic determinants in specification (5), the 
estimated  IRR  for  the  change  in  EU  unemployment  rate  drops  considerably,  and  it  is  no  longer 
statistically significant. There is no qualitative change to the other key determinants.  Finally, when 
the dependent variable is defined as antidumping alone in specification (6), there is no statistically 
significant evidence of a relationship between macroeconomic shocks and import protection. This 
specification notably omits an extensive set of import restrictions on steel products through the EU’s 
global safeguards policy in 2002.  
Figure 3 provides information on the magnitudes of the estimated IRRs for the US and EU 
samples of data. The US panel is based on specifications (1) and (2), and the EU panel is based on 
specifications (4) and (5). The figure follows the approach of Figure 2 by presenting the percent 
increase in the count of imported products per trading partner per quarter subject to new TTBs that 
are associated with a one standard deviation change in each macroeconomic determinant. For the 
United States, a one standard deviation appreciation of the dollar is 16 percent (see Table 1) and is 
associated with a 21 (99) percent increase in imported products being subject to TTBs per trading 
partner  per  quarter,  relative  to  the  model’s  estimates  in  specification  (1)  (specification  (2), 
respectively) at the means of the data. For the EU, a one standard deviation appreciation of the euro 
is  13  percent  and  it  leads  to  49  (85)  percent  more  protection  according  to  specification  (4) 
(specification (5), respectively). A one standard deviation increase in the domestic unemployment 
rate leads to 41 (65) percent more protection for the United States, and 26 (221) percent more 
protection for the EU . Finally, a one standard deviation decline in trading partner real GDP growth is 
associated with 25 (70) percent more US import protection and 43 (95) percent more EU import 
protection. 
Returning to Table 3, the remaining columns apply the modeling approach and robustness 
checks to the subsample of the relatively smaller economies of Australia, Canada, and South Korea. 
On average for these three countries, the estimated IRRs are in line with the theory; however, the   18 
IRRs are not consistently statistically significant across different specifications.  Thus the estimated 
trade policy response through these TTBs to macroeconomic shocks appears to be somewhat weaker 
for  smaller  industrialized  countries  than  for  the  United  States  and  European  Union.
23  One likely 
contributing explanation is that these economies are less frequent users of TTBs, on average, than the 
US and EU (see again Table 1).
24 
 
4  Import Protection during the Great Recession 
4.1   Protectionist expectations 
 
During  the  early  period  of  the  Great  Recession,  a  widespread  fear  of  “protectionism”  among 
policymakers led to the coordinated, G20 declaration of November 2008 cited above.  Furthermore, 
policymakers asked major multilateral institutions to establish new trade policy surveillance initiatives 
in order to monitor and report on national changes in policies that could impact international trade.
25 
Figure 4 provides one explanation for the increased concern over “protectionism” and the 
associated response. The left panels of Figure 4 take the US and EU model estimates from Table 3 – 
i.e., based on pre-crisis data – and generate the predicted import protection response over 2008:Q4-
2010:Q4 given the realized macroeconomic data from this period. The historical models for the US 
and  EU  predict  a  sharp  increase  in  import  protection  beginning  in  2009:Q2  and  lasting  through 
2010:Q1, peaking in 2009:Q3. To provide some context, the median number of products subject to 
                                                            
23 An interesting empirical question is whether the South Korean experience during the Asian Financial crisis of 
1997-1998 foreshadowed what would happen in the US and EU during the Great Recession. Like the US and EU 
during 2008-2010 that we detail below, South Korea did not turn to heavy TTB use during 1997-1998. However, 
in other regards the two crises appear more different than similar. While South Korea did experience a sharp 
increase in its unemployment rate, the behavior of its real exchange rate and of the GDP growth of foreign 
trading partners was markedly different from the analogous variables facing the US and EU during the Great 
Recession. In contrast to the real US dollar, which appreciated sharply at the start of the more recent global 
financial crisis, the real Korean won depreciated sharply in 1997. Further, the Asian Financial Crisis did not lead 
to a slowdown in GDP growth around the world. Thus, the applicability of the South Korean experience to later 
financial crises in industrialized economies is limited. 
 
24 In unreported results, we have also investigated whether including the WTO disciplines  variable – introduced 
in section 3.1 and included in Table 2, specification (7) – improves upon the estimates for this subsample of 
countries. It does not, which suggests that the main impact captured by the WTO disciplines variable in Table 2, 
specification (7) is  due to  variation across the  five  policy-imposing  economies  -  e.g., the US and EU have 
relatively more products bound by WTO disciplines than do Australia, Canada and South Korea – and not from 
inter-temporal variation within one of these policy-imposing economies. 
 
25 Bown (2011c) provides a discussion of the World Bank’s initiatives, as well as efforts by the World Trade 
Organization Secretariat and the establishment of the high-profile Global Trade Alert.    19 
new US TTBs against these 15 trading partners per quarter between 1988:Q1 and 2008:Q3 was 12. 
The model’s US prediction for 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 peaks at 647 products being subject to new TTBs in 
2009:Q3. The median number of products subject to new EU TTBs against these 15 trading partners 
per quarter between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q3 was 9. The model’s EU prediction for new TTBs peaks at 
264 products in 2009:Q3. 
To provide additional context, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest the historical 
models forecast an upper bound of roughly 15 percent of US and EU nonoil imports becoming subject 
to new import protection during the Great Recession. In particular, the US model predicted that 
cumulatively 1558 new imported product – trading partner combinations would become subject to 
new TTB investigations during the period of 2008:Q4 through 2010:Q4. If we multiply the value of 
imports for a relevant target in 2007 by the predicted number of TTBs, we arrive at an upper estimate 
that 15.4 percent of US non-oil imports could expect to face new US TTBs.
26 Similarly for the EU, the 
cumulative effect of its  predicted 623 imported product – trading partner TTBs (see again Figure 4) 
translate into 14.0 percent of EU non-oil imports.
27 Estimates from Bown (2011a) put the  trade-
weighted share of US and EU imports subject to the existing stock of TTBs at only 2 -3 percent 
immediately preceding the crisis in 2007 . The implication is that   TTB coverage of imports  was 
predicted to increase 5-7 times above pre-crisis levels. 
The reasons for the predicted run-up in new import protection illustrated in Figure 4 are clear 
given the results of Table 3 for the US and EU and the magnitude of the worldwide recession – i.e., 
new import protection was historically associated with rising domestic unemployment and economic 
contraction abroad. The unemployment rate rose significantly in both economies. The simultaneity of 
the  recession  across  the  world  implied  that  virtually  every  US  and  EU  trading  partner  was  also 
undergoing a sharp decline in real GDP growth during this period. These factors combined to create a 
                                                            
26 To clarify the thought experiment, the import data used to construct these shares are all taken from 2007, to 
remove any potential contamination associated with the 2008-9 trade collapse. Nevertheless, the products in 
focus would not become subject to TTB policies until 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. The mean value of annual imports in 
2007 for one of the 94 product – trading partner combinations that were actually confronted with new US TTBs 
between 2008:Q4 and 2010:Q4 was $133.4 million. The estimate of 15.4 percent is derived by taking this $133.4 
million, multiplying it by 1558 product – trading partner combinations, and dividing by $1.34 trillion – i.e., the 
total US non-oil imports from these 15 trading partners in 2007. The estimate is an upper limit given that 
product – trading partner combinations affected by US TTBs in the data ($133.4 million) are much higher than 
the mean product – trading partner combination in the entire sample ($30.2 million) which includes non-TTB 
affected products. 
 
27 Even though the EU had a much lower  predicted count of TTBs (623 versus 1558), the mean value of EU 
annual imports in 2007 for the 84  relevant product – trading partner combinations was $247.3 million. Finally, 
EU non-oil imports from its sample of 15 trading partners in 2007 were $1.1 trillion.   20 
perfect storm of conditions for a large increase in new import protection, given the way policymakers 
in the US and EU had historically responded, as documented in Table 3. 
Nevertheless, as the solid line of the right panel of Figure 4 illustrates, the realization of new 
import protection for the US and EU was different from the model predictions. While the timing of the 
predicted US peak in 2009:Q3 corresponds with the realized peak of TTBs, the magnitude of the 
realized increase was much smaller. Cumulatively across the 15 trading partners under study, the US 
responded with 16 times fewer TTBs than the pre-crisis model estimates predicted. Similarly, the EU 
responded with  nearly  8 times  fewer  new  TTBs than  the model  predicted.  US  TTBs  affected  0.9 
percent of nonoil imports, far less than the forecasted upper limit of 15.4 percent. EU TTBs affected 
1.9  percent  of  nonoil  imports,  also  far  less  than  its  forecasted  upper  limit  of  14.0  percent. 
Furthermore, for the EU, the difference between the left panel and the solid line of the right panel 
also illustrates that the timing of new import protection was delayed by three quarters (from 2009:Q3 
to 2010:Q2) relative to the pre-crisis model’s predictions. 
 
4.2   Why did so little import protection arise? 
 
Given  the  severity  of  macroeconomic  shocks  that  took  place  during  the  Great  Recession,  a 
fundamental question is what explains the import protection that did and did not arise? To address 
this question systematically, we re-estimate our preferred specifications from Tables 2 and 3 on a 
time  series  of  data  that  extends  through  the  crisis  period  of  2010:Q4.  We  introduce  pre-crisis 
(1988:Q1-2008:Q3)  and crisis  (2008:Q4-2010:Q4)  dummy variables to  interact  with  the three  key 
macroeconomic  determinants  so  that  we  can  test  for  whether  import  protection  responded  to 
macroeconomic  shocks  differentially  across  the  two  sub-periods.
28  We consider three different 
samples of data; the full sample of all five policy -imposing economies, and then two  subsamples in 
which the United States or the European Union is the   policy-imposing economy.  Table  1  again 
provides summary statistics that highlight the differences in  means and standard deviations of  the 
underlying data series across the two sub-periods. 
Table 4 presents our results under this approach. First  consider the estimates on the  full 
sample  of  data.  For  the  1988:Q1 -2008:Q3  period,  the  estimated  IRRs   for  each  of  the  three 
                                                            
28 The qualitative pattern to our results does not change if we move the definition of the beginning of the crisis 
period by 1 or 2 quarters. 
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macroeconomic determinants are close to the size of the corresponding estimates in Table 2 that we 
discussed in Section 3.1.
29  
How did the  trade policy  responsiveness to macroeconomic fluctuations   change  during 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4?  According  to  the  baseline  specification  (1),  in  which  the  macroeconomic 
determinants are each defined at one lag (t-1), the Chi-squared test statistics with one degree of 
freedom (reported in square brackets) indicate that there is a statistically significant change in each of 
the estimated IRRs between the pre-crisis and post-2008:Q3 period. The IRR estimate of 1.00 on the 
bilateral real exchange rate is statistically different from the pre-crisis IRR estimate of 1.02, the IRR 
estimate of 1.06 on the domestic unemployment change is statistically different from the pre-crisis 
IRR estimate of 1.63, and the IRR estimate of 1.03 on foreign GDP growth is statistically different from 
the  pre-crisis  IRR  estimate  of  0.88.  However,  not  all  of  these  changes  are  robust  to  slight 
modifications to the baseline model. In specification (2), for example, if we redefine the determinants 
to each be at the second lag (t-2) instead of the first lag, then the statistically significant differential 
for the domestic unemployment rate change is eliminated. Specification (3) introduces one additional 
explanatory variable, defined as the growth rate in bilateral imports.
30 This variable is included to  
address the concern that import protection through TTBs is typically associated with substantial 
import growth; thus the muted import protection response during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 could be due to 
the global collapse in trade flows that took place in 2008 -9 (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009).
31  The 
estimated IRR  on this variable  for the pre-crisis period is not statistically different from 1 ;  more 
importantly, controlling for imports does not affect either the qualitative nor quantitative nature of 
our results  for the  pre-crisis estimates of the other macroeconomic determinants  of interest . 
However, inclusion of this variable in specification (3) does  eliminate the statistically significant 
differential (across sub-periods) for the variable defined as the percent change in the bilateral real 
exchange rate. On balance, the model estimates are not sufficiently robust across specifications  to 
                                                            
29 The estimates for the 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 period in Table 4 are not identical to the corresponding Table 2 or 
Table  3  estimates  because  the  empirical  models  embed  an  assumption  that  the  importer  i  and  exporter  j 
combined fixed effects are the same across both the 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 sub-periods. 
 
30 Due to a lack of quarterly data on trading -partner specific import price indices, these data are in nominal 
terms. However, because this variable is also constructed from year-over-year data, we are not concerned with 
potential seasonality issues. 
 
31 In principle, a necessary legal condition under WTO rules for applying each of the TTB policies is that the 
domestic industry should be injured  because of imports – whether they be dumped (antidumping), subsidized 
(countervailing duties) or surging (safeguards). In theory, evidence that imports had recently been in decline 
could make it more difficult for government authorities to impose TTBs.    22 
allow  us  to  conclude  that  there  was  a  change  in  the  relationship  between  trade  policy  and  the 
exchange rate or between trade policy and domestic unemployment during the Great Recession.   
Nevertheless, the one variable for which there is an important estimated change is foreign 
real GDP growth. For example, the pre-crisis IRR estimate of 0.88 in specification (1) indicates that 
policy-imposing economies had used import protection against trading partners with weak economic 
growth. In contrast, the estimated IRR on foreign real GDP growth is 1.03 during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. 
While this second IRR was not statistically greater than 1, the pre-crisis and crisis IRRs are statistically 
different from one another, thus signaling a change in behavior. Therefore, these economies switched 
toward  implementation  of  new  TTB  import  protection  against  those  trading  partners  that  were 
experiencing relatively stronger economic growth during the Great Recession.  This is a particularly 
important contributor to the low levels of import protection that arose during this period. 
Columns (4) through (7) confirm this result for the United States and the European Union.  In 
fact, the only statistically significant estimated IRR change that is robust across these two sub-periods 
for both the United States in specifications (4) and (5) and the European Union in specifications (6) 
and (7) is the differential on foreign real GDP growth. As in the full sample of data, there is evidence 
that the US and EU switched away from imposing import protection on trading partners that were 
experiencing macroeconomic weakness, as had been the historical pattern, and toward those that 
were growing. With so many US and EU trading partners undergoing economic contraction during 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4, the implication of this effect was to reduce new US and EU import protection 
overall relative to pre-crisis predictions.  
Consider  next  the  two  other  macroeconomic  determinants  of  interest  for  each  of  the 
subsamples of data in Table 4. For the United States, the estimated IRRs for these two determinants 
did not change during the crisis in statistically meaningful ways away from the 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
estimates. For example, in specification (4), the IRR estimate of 1.06 on the bilateral real exchange 
rate is not statistically different from the pre-crisis IRR estimate of 1.03, and the IRR estimate of 1.87 
on the domestic unemployment change is not statistically different from the pre-crisis IRR estimate of 
2.16.  The  same  pattern  holds  when  we  redefine  the  macroeconomic  determinants  at  t-2  in 
specification (5). Furthermore, results from the European Union sample are like the United States in 
that the IRR estimate on the domestic unemployment rate change during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 is not 
consistently different from the IRR estimate from prior to the crisis. While specification (6) presents 
evidence of a differential, this is not robust to redefining the macroeconomic determinants at two   23 
lags. As described earlier, the estimated IRR for the unemployment rate change appears particularly 
sensitive to the relatively shorter time series of available data for the EU sample. 
However, there is one other robust differential between estimated IRRs from the European 
Union sample. The estimated IRRs for the EU’s bilateral real exchange rate for 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 are 
less than 1 and they are statistically less than the EU’s IRR estimate for the earlier period. Thus there 
is some evidence of a change in that the EU imposed fewer TTBs in response to the euro appreciation 
early in the crisis period (see again Figure 1), given the EU’s 1999:Q1-2008:Q3 IRR estimate which 
indicated that an appreciation of the euro currency historically led to more TTBs.  
Nevertheless,  a  final  contributing  explanation  for  the  lack  of  a  major  import  protection 
response  by the  United  States or the  European Union  during  2008:Q4-2010:Q4  is  related  to  the 
movements in each economy’s bilateral real exchange rates over the period. The historical evidence 
for the EU and US is that real currency appreciations led to more import protection through TTBs. As 
the grey line in Figure 1 again illustrates for the EU, for much of the 2008-2010 period the euro is 
depreciating. Furthermore, shortly after the sharp appreciation of the US dollar in 2009:Q1, the dollar 
depreciated by a nearly identical amount, and then continued a period of weakening throughout 




5  Conclusion 
 
This paper uses quarterly data for the United States, European Union, and three other industrialized 
economies to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on import protection over 1988:Q1-
2010:Q4. Estimates from a data sample taken before the Great Recession exhibit evidence of three 
key relationships. First, there is strong evidence of a countercyclical relationship between domestic 
macroeconomic shocks – increases in domestic unemployment rates or reductions in domestic real 
GDP  growth  –  and  governments  initiating  new  temporary  trade  barrier  investigations  over 
significantly  more  imported  products  per  trading  partner  per  quarter.  Second,  we  find  these 
economies used such bilateral import restrictions against trading partners that were going through 
their own periods of weak economic growth. Third, a real appreciation of the bilateral exchange rate 
defined in terms of the domestic currency is associated with  increases to these forms of import 
protection. Overall, we find this evidence is especially strong for import protection by the United   24 
States and European Union, and the evidence is weaker for smaller economies such as Australia, 
Canada, and South Korea. 
In a second exercise, we use estimates from the pre-Great Recession model to then show the 
expected trade policy response during 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 given the realized macroeconomic shocks. 
The historical models for the US and EU in particular predicted a sharp increase in import protection 
taking  place  beginning  in  2009:Q2  and  lasting  through  2010:Q1,  peaking  in  2009:Q3.  While  the 
increase in import protection during the Great Recession was not as large as the potential additional 
15 percentage point coverage of imports that some historical models predicted, arguably the fear of 
this realization contributed to the pre-emptive “anti-protectionism” G20 declaration of November 
2008 and a number of initiatives to actively monitor trade policy (by the WTO, World Bank, and Global 
Trade Alert) beginning in early 2009.   
Third, we re-estimate the models on data from the Great Recession period in order to explain 
deviations to the realized protectionist response away from historical behavior. We do not find robust 
evidence of a change to the countercyclical relationship between domestic unemployment and new 
import  protection.  However,  we  do  provide  evidence  that  these  policy-imposing  economies 
“switched”  from  their  historical  behavior;  during  the  Great  Recession  they  shifted  new  import 
protection away from those trading partners that were contracting and toward those experiencing 
relatively  stronger  economic  growth.  This  evidence,  in  addition  to  the  sharp  and  persistent  real 
depreciations of the US dollar and euro after their initial run-up in 2009, were particularly important 
contributors to the relatively low levels of import protection that arose given that so many trading 
partners were themselves experiencing periods of severe economic contraction during 2008-2010.  
Finally, our results contribute to a substantial literature that has evolved to explain the role of 
trade agreements and the use of temporary trade barriers under the WTO. Our paper identifies the 
importance of bilateral channels through which new trade barriers arise, and how these channels 
differed in 2008-2010 relative to periods before the Great Recession.
 Nevertheless, even this research 
is just one additional step in understanding the role of trade agreements, including the potential limits 
to what trade agreements can accomplish in maintaining trade policy cooperation across countries. 
Indeed, economies like the United States and European Union are no longer the “biggest” users of 
temporary trade barrier policies. Whether the major new emerging economy users of these policies – 
India, China, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey, for example – respond similarly to macroeconomic shocks 
remains an open question. 
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Appendix: Data Description 
 
Temporary trade barrier data under antidumping, countervailing duty, global safeguards, and the 
China-specific safeguard policies at the Harmonized System 6-digit level by trading partner for 
1988-2010  is  compiled  by  the  authors  from  the  World  Bank’s  Temporary  Trade  Barriers 
Database (Bown, 2011b) which is publicly available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/ . 
 
Bilateral real exchange rate series come from the USDA’s Agricultural Exchange Rate Dataset. For 
each quarterly observation we use the value as of the last month of the quarter.  
 
Domestic unemployment rate change is calculated at the quarterly frequency as the year-over-year 
changes with data from the International Labor Organization. 
 
Real GDP growth is calculated as the year-over-year changes.  There are a total of 18 economies from 
which we require data on real GDP growth. Unless otherwise noted, each economy had data 
available for 1988:Q1-2010:Q4 in the form of a seasonally adjusted, quarterly real GDP series 
taken from OECD. The EU (EU27) and Israel’s series begin in 1995:Q1. Turkey’s series begins 
in 1998:Q1. Furthermore, series for Brazil (beginning in 1996:Q1), Japan, Indonesia (beginning 
in 1990:Q1), and India (beginning in 1996:Q2) are from Haver OECD MEI. Mexico and South 
Africa’s series are from IFS. China’s quarterly year-on-year real GDP growth series are from 
official  government  statistics  and  begin  in  1992:Q1.  Taiwan’s  series  are  from  official 
government statistics. 
 
Change in the share of imported products under WTO discipline. This variable is calculated at the 
annual frequency for 1995-2010 based on HS-06 applied MFN tariffs and WTO bindings data 
available from UNCTAD (TRAINS) and the WTO’s Integrated Database through WITS. 
 
Trading Partners: For each of the five policy-imposing economies j, with the exception of South Korea, 
the  bilateral  relationship  is  with  one  of  15  its  trading  partners  i.  The  15  partners  are 
determined as the most frequent targets against which each economy used such import 
protection  over  the  sample  period,  conditional  on  availability  of  that  trading  partner’s 
macroeconomic data at the quarterly frequency. The trading partners for each are:   29 
  United States (15): Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, 
Japan,  Mexico,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa,  South  Korea,  Switzerland,  Taiwan,  China; 
Turkey. These economies were the source of 85 percent of non-oil imports during this 
period. 
  European  Union  (15):  Australia,  Brazil,  China,  India,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Mexico,  New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, China; Turkey, United 
States. These economies were the source of 75 percent of non-oil imports during this 
period. 
  South Korea (10): Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland,  Taiwan,  China,  United  States.  These  economies  were  the  source  of  79 
percent of non-oil imports during this period. 
  Australia  (15):  Brazil,  Canada,  China,  European  Union,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Japan, 
Mexico, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, China; Turkey, United States. These 
economies were the source of 81 percent of non-oil imports during this period. 
  Canada (15): Australia, Brazil, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, 
New  Zealand,  South  Africa,  South  Korea,  Switzerland,  Taiwan,  China;  Turkey,  United 
States. These economies were the source of 94 percent of non-oil imports during this 
period. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, 1988:Q1-2010:Q4 
 











         
Dependent Variables         
All trade policy initiations ijt (products per quarter per 
trading partner), 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
1.25  2.76  1.98  0.51 
(6.41)  (10.28)  (9.13)  (2.41) 
All trade policy initiations ijt (products per quarter per 
trading partner), 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
0.37  0.70  0.62  0.16 
(1.65)  (2.87)  (1.56)  (0.81) 
Antidumping initiations only ijt (products per quarter 
per trading partner), 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
0.76  1.81  0.53  0.40 
(3.46)  (5.93)  (1.73)  (2.09) 
Explanatory Variables         
Percent change in bilateral real exchange rate ijt, 
1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
0.85  0.24  1.47  0.96 
(14.70)  (15.87)  (12.38)  (14.69) 
Percent change in bilateral real exchange rate ijt, 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
-1.35  -0.28  -5.87  -0.06 
(14.37)  (15.69)  (13.19)  (13.97) 
Domestic unemployment rate change jt, 1988:Q1-
2008:Q3 
-0.13  -0.02  -0.35  -0.13 
(0.86)  (0.66)  (0.51)  (0.97) 
Domestic unemployment rate change jt,, 2008:Q4-
2010:Q4 
1.06  1.82  1.75  0.51 
(1.35)  (1.73)  (1.04)  (0.99) 
Domestic real GDP growth jt, 1988:Q1-2008:Q3  3.41  2.92  2.45  3.80 
(2.30)  (1.41)  (1.02)  (2.65) 
Real GDP growth of trading partner it, 1988:Q1-
2008:Q3 
4.08  4.06  4.11  4.09 
(3.50)  (3.56)  (3.10)  (3.56) 
Real GDP growth of trading partner it, 2008:Q4-
2010:Q4 
2.18  2.19  2.19  2.17 
(5.42)  (5.40)  (5.37)  (5.45) 
Import growth from trading partner ijt, 1988:Q1-
2008:Q3 
11.50  8.46  11.80  12.60 
(23.03)  (11.69)  (14.21)  (27.32) 
Import growth from trading partner ijt, 2008:Q4-
2010:Q4 
0.96  0.14  -7.09  4.29 
(29.87)  (25.74)  (20.59)  (33.50) 
         
Observations  5036  1195  719  3122 
Notes: sample means reported with standard deviations reported below in parentheses. ‡EU is defined 
throughout as EU-27, its data are for 1999:Q1-2010:Q4 only.  31 
 
Table 2. Negative Binomial Model Estimates of Macroeconomic Determinants of Import Protection, 1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
 














































(3.97)  (3.98)  (4.54)  (4.92)  (0.29)  (4.01)  (3.60)  (4.08) 
Domestic unemployment rate change  jt-1  1.62







(6.61)    (6.57)  (2.05)  (4.30)  (3.71)  (5.14)  (5.05) 
Domestic real GDP growth jt-1  --  0.93
b  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
  (2.28)             









(6.13)  (6.70)  (1.96)  (4.58)  (3.82)  (5.95)  (3.91)  (4.07) 









(2.99)  (3.84)  (1.80)  (2.95)  (3.24)  (2.99)  (7.01)  (7.20) 
Domestic unemployment rate change  jt-1 x Real 
GDP growth of trading partner it-1 
--  --  --  --  --  1.01  --  -- 
          (0.59)     
Change in the share of imported products under 
WTO discipline in jt-1 
--  --  --  --  --  --  1.04  -- 
            (1.58)   
Stock of TTBs against trading partner ijt-1  --  --  --  --  --  --  0.99
b  -- 
            (2.47)   
Import and exporter combined fixed effects  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Importer and exporter separate fixed effects  no  no  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
Observations  4406  4406  4406  4380  4406  4406  3218  3218 
Notes: Policy-imposing economies j (Australia, Canada, EU, South Korea, US) vis-à-vis one of 15 trading partners i (listed in the Appendix) over 1988:Q1-2008:Q3. 
Data for the EU as policy imposer are restricted to 1999:Q1-2008:Q3 throughout. In (7) and (8), data for the other four policy-imposing economies are restricted to 
1995:Q1-2008:Q3. Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs) are reported in lieu of coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. Model includes a constant term whose 
estimate is suppressed. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.    32 
 




Dependent variable: Bilateral (ij) count of products  
initiated under all temporary trade barrier policies or antidumping (AD) in quarter t by country(ies) listed below 
 





























Percent change in bilateral real 
exchange rate  ijt-1 
1.03
a  1.04
a  1.00  1.03
b  1.05
a  1.02  1.00  1.00  1.00 
(3.53)  (5.26)  (0.15)  (2.28)  (3.91)  (1.61)  (0.64)  (0.04)  (0.54) 
Domestic unemployment rate 





a  1.61  0.95  1.43
a  1.12  1.27
a 
(4.62)  (2.72)  (4.70)  (6.33)  (1.17)  (0.16)  (4.36)  (1.29)  (2.61) 







a  1.01  0.94
b  0.94
b  0.96 
(4.69)  (2.03)  (4.01)  (1.65)  (2.65)  (0.29)  (1.97)  (2.13)  (1.16) 






c  1.00  1.00  1.00 
(3.74)  (3.61)  (4.42)  (4.96)  (3.33)  (1.78)  (0.26)  (0.05)  (0.81) 










(6.01)  (4.52)  (6.78)  (5.02)  (4.54)  (4.78)  (3.46)  (3.48)  (3.05) 
Import and exporter combined 
fixed effects 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  1060  1053  1060  584  583  584  2762  2744  2762 
Notes: The trading partners i of each importer j  are listed in the Appendix. ‡Data for the EU as policy imposer j in specifications (4), (5) and (6) are restricted to 
1999:Q1-2008:Q3. Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs) are reported in lieu of coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses. Model includes a constant term 
whose estimate is suppressed. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Each explanatory variable is 
lagged two quarters (at t-2) in lieu of one quarter (t-1) in specifications (2), (5), and (8)  
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Table 4. Differential Impacts on Policy Response during the Great Recession 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral count of products initiated 
under all temporary trade barrier policies in quarter t by country(ies) listed below 












 lag  
(4) 
Second 






lag   
 (7) 
               
Percent change in bilateral real 









(4.23)  (5.00)  (5.03)  (3.58)  (5.31)  (2.60)  (4.45) 
Percent change in bilateral real 
exchange rate  ijt-1, 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 




(0.26)  (0.34)  (0.90)  (1.59)  (1.94)  (2.46)  (2.53) 
    [Test statistic]  [4.23]
 b  [3.17]
 c  [1.38]  [0.63]  [0.15]  [10.65]
a  [16.84]
a 
               








a  1.58 
(6.72)  (2.01)  (1.87)  (4.55)  (2.58)  (6.60)  (1.19) 
Domestic unemployment rate change  
jt-1, 2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
1.06  1.16  0.96  1.87
b  1.77
b  0.59  2.31
c 
(0.46)  (1.05)  (0.24)  (2.56)  (2.20)  (1.29)  (1.94) 
    [Test statistic]  [8.34]
a  [0.00]  [1.01]  [0.22]  [0.03]  [26.84]
a  [0.44] 
               










(6.41)  (4.90)  (4.64)  (5.31)  (2.62)  (1.66)  (2.46) 
Real GDP growth of trading partner it-1, 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
1.03  1.01  1.04  1.09  1.08  1.08  1.09 
(0.90)  (0.37)  (1.14)  (1.24)  (1.30)  (1.01)  (1.07) 






b   [8.30]
b 
               
Import growth from trading partner it-1, 
1988:Q1-2008:Q3 
--  --  1.00  --  --  --  -- 
    (0.48)         
Import growth from trading partner it-1, 
2008:Q4-2010:Q4 
--  --  0.98
c  --  --  --  -- 
    (1.82)         
    [Test statistic]  --  --  [2.65]  --  --  --  -- 
Time trend included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Import and exporter combined fixed 
effects 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  5036  5010  5007  1195  1188  719  718 
Notes: “All countries” includes the five economies j (Australia, Canada, EU, South Korea, US) vis-à-vis one of 15 trading 
partners i (listed in the Appendix) over 1988:Q1-2010:Q4. ‡Data for the EU as policy imposer are restricted to 1999:Q1-
2010:Q4  throughout.  Incidence  Rate  Ratios  (IRRs)  are  reported  in  lieu  of  coefficient  estimates,  with  t-statistics  in 
parentheses. Chi-squared test statistics with one degree of freedom are reported in square brackets. Model includes a 
constant term whose estimate is suppressed. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Each explanatory variable is lagged one quarter (at t-1) in specifications (1), (4), and (6) and two 
quarters (at t-2) in specifications (2), (3), (5), and (7).   34 




Country, non-TTB Import-restricting policy  Date of Inception 
    Australia 
    Increase of excise rates on imports of tobacco  April 30, 2010 
  Customer price index adjustment for alcohol and tobacco products  August 2, 2010 
    Canada 
    Temporary tariff-rate quota on milk protein substitutes  March 1, 2009 
  Lower threshold for delisting wines in provincial liquor stores  July 20, 2009 
    South Korea 
    Increased tariffs for 16 selected products  January 1, 2009 
  Restoration of tariff on imports of crude oil to 3%  March 1, 2009 
    United States 
    Reclassification subjecting certain solar panels to a 2.5% tariff  January 9, 2009 
  Ban on poultry imports from China  March 11, 2009 
  Adoption of a ban against imports of Mexican shrimp  April 20, 2010 
  Ban on the importation of Asian carp  December 14, 2010 
    Source: compiled by the authors from Global Trade Alert at www.globaltradealert.org, last accessed 
29 February 2012. See discussion in footnote 1. 35 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Import protection initiations, 
count 
(left axis)







Source: constructed by the authors from quarterly data from OECD, USDA, and IMF and Bown (2011b). Increases in the real 
exchange rate series reflect appreciations of the domestic currency. EU data for 1999:Q1-2010:Q4 only. 
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Negative shock to foreign economy 
(decline in foreign real GDP growth)
Percent change in HS-06 
products subject to new 
import protection in 
response to one s.d. shock
Table 2 column (1) specification with increase in domestic unemployment









Notes: Percent increase in HS-06 products subject to new import protection per quarter per trading partner. 
Based on table 2 model estimates and a one standard deviation change in each explanatory variable away from 
the sample mean, holding all other variables constant. 
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Percent change in HS-06 
products subject to new 
import protection in 
response to one s.d. shock
United States
















Percent change in HS-06 
products subject to new 
import protection in 
response to one s.d. shock
European Union
TTB response to t-1 shock TTB response to t-2 shock
 
Notes: Percent increase in HS-06 products subject to new import protection per quarter per trading partner. 
Based on table 3 model estimates and a one standard deviation change in each explanatory variable away from 
the sample mean, holding all other variables constant. 38 
 
Figure 4. United States and European Union: 































Prediction from pre-crisis sample only (total products = 1558)































































Prediction from pre-crisis sample only (total products = 623)
































Actual (total products = 84)
 
Notes: Prediction of number of imported products from 15 trading partners per quarter subject to new TTBs from the pre-crisis sample based on estimates 
from Table 3 specification (2) for the US and specification (5) for the EU. For context, the median number of products subject to new US TTBs against these 15 
trading partners per quarter between 1988:Q1 and 2008:Q3 was 12, for the EU between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q3 the median was 9. 
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